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Abstract
This paper introduces a novel architecture of distributed systems—called framed
distributed system, or FDS—that braces a given system via a built-in virtual frame-
work that controls the flow of messages between system components, and between
them and their environment—while being oblivious of the code of the communicating
components. This control is carried out in a decentralized, and thus scalable, manner.
The FDS architecture is expected to have a significant impact on the dependability
and security of distributed systems, and on the whole life cycle of such systems.
Although this architecture has been designed specifically for SOA-like heteroge-
neous and open systems—whose components may be written in different languages,
may run on different platforms, and may be designed, constructed, and even maintained
under different administrative domains—it should be useful for distributed systems in
general.
1 Introduction
Heterogeneous distributed systems suffers from serious difficulties in establishing reliable sys-
tem properties—i.e., properties that span an entire system; or that involve a set of compo-
nents dispersed throughout the system, such as a coordination protocol between the members
of collaborating group of components. The difficulties are in: (a) the reliable implementation
of such properties; (b) the verification that a property of this kind has been implemented
correctly; and (c) the dependability of system properties, namely, their resilience to failures
and attacks, and their stability with respect to the evolution of the system.
Dealing with these difficulties is particularly hard in systems whose components may be
written in different languages, may run on different platforms, and may be designed, con-
structed, and even maintained under different administrative domains. Such systems are
often said to have an open architecture, or just being open1 [12, 4]—because of the lack of
1The term “open,” as used here, has nothing to do with the concept of open source.
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effective constraints on the organization of the system as a whole, and on the internals of
its disparate components. Systems are increasingly designed to be open, with the hope that
this would make them more flexible. The concept of service oriented architecture [32] (SOA)
is a prominent example of this trend, which is being adopted by a wide range of complex
distributed systems, such as: commercial enterprises, societal and governmental institu-
tions, and various types of virtual organizations (VOs). Moreover, even virtually monolithic
systems—namely, systems that are constructed according to a single overall design, and
maintained by a single organization—tend to become partially open in time, because of the
difficulties in controlling their evolution; and when several organizations, each with its own
monolithic software, merge, forming some kind of federations.
To illustrate the problematic nature of both the reliable implementation of system prop-
erties and their dependability in open systems, consider the following simple example:
Let v be a widely used, and vital, component of an open distributed system,
called Acme. And suppose that for v to be able to protect itself against denial
of service caused by too many messages send to it from other components of
Acme, this system is designed to satisfy the following (simplified) rate-control
(RC) protocol2:
Once an arbitrary component x of Acme gets a message
slowDownTo(r) from v, it would limit the rate of sending messages
to v to the specified rate r.
The conventional, and seemingly natural, approach for establishing such a global protocol as
a system-regularity—namely, ensuring that it is really observed everywhere in the system—is
code based. That is, one should program each system component carefully to comply with the
given protocol. But doing so everywhere in a large and heterogeneous system, is laborious,
error prone, and hard to verify. And even if the RC protocol is established correctly in
this manner, say by distributing communication stabs that comply with RC to all system
components—which is possible when all the components are written in a single language—it
would not be easy to verify that these stabs are adopted correctly everywhere in the system.
So, the code-based implementation is not very reliable. It is also not dependable, because it
can be easily violated by an inadvertent or malicious change in any component. (Note that
the TCP flow-control might not help v, because the issue here is not messaging congestion
in the Internet around the sender of a message and its receiver, but the ability of v to handle
messages.)
In a local (i.e., not distributed) system, written in a suitable language, one may implement
the RC protocol via techniques like reflection, as under meta object protocol (MOP) [15]; or
via aspect oriented programming (AOP) [13]. AOP can be used even for a centrally managed
distributed system, if all its components are written in a single language that support AOP;
but it cannot be used for a truly open system.
The approach advocated by the proponents of SOA for addressing such problems involves
“good software engineering practices,” and what is called “governance techniques” [32]—
where “governance” means managerial techniques for establishing policies about the pro-
2This protocol is oversimplified; a more proper protocol would buffer messages sent too fast, and send
them to v automatically as fast as possible, subject to the constraint imposed by v.
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cesses of creation and evolution of the system at hand. Such a human-based discipline is
indeed necessary, but it is not sufficient; there is a need for a more rigorous, and more effective
approach for addressing these fundamental difficulties with open distributed systems.
The Contribution of this Paper: We address here these basic difficulties by introducing
the concept of framed distributed system (FDS), which is a system that operates and evolves
under a framework that governs the exchange of messages between system components, and
between them and their environment. More specifically, the framework of an FDS consists of
a set of strictly enforced laws about the flow of messages in the system; laws that are oblivious
of the code of the components that send and receive such messages. Such obliviousness is
necessary for open systems, because of the lack of global knowledge of, and control over,
the code of many of the their components. And it also has the advantage of rendering the
framework, and the properties established by it, independent of the code that populate the
various system components, and thus invariant of the evolution of this code.
Of course, the Independence of the code of system components also means that the
framework can have only marginal effect on the functionality of the system. But it is our
thesis that a framework can have significant impact on important non-functional qualities
of the system governed by it, such as enhancing its dependability.
The framework of an FDS is different from the concept of architectural model [9, 21],
which is an external specification of certain aspect of a system that are required to be
implemented by its code. This model is generally not enforced, it is therefor prone to a gap
between the model and the actual system behavior, as is well known [29]. However, since
the framework of an FDS is enforced, the framework can be considered as an integral part
of the system—although it is not part of any system component. One can draw an analogy
between the framework of an FDS and the rigid metal framework of a building. The latter
has little effect on the internals of the building such as its internal walls, doors, and windows;
and on how the building is to function. And yet, this metal framework provides its building
with an indispensable degree of dependability, stability and safely. The framework of an
FDS is expected to provide analogous benefits.
The Structure of this Paper: The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 in-
troduces the principles on which the concept of FDS is based. Section 3 describes briefly the
middleware—called Law Governed Interaction (LGI)—employed by our FDS architecture.
Section 4 introduces the architecture of framed distributed systems. Section 5 describes an
implemented case study of an FDS, which provides a concrete realization of this architec-
ture. Section 6 discusses the potential impact of FDS on the dependability of distributed
systems, focusing on fault tolerance at the application level of systems; (we expect the FDS
architecture to have a broad impact on the entire life cycle of distributed systems: on their
design, construction, and evolution—but a detailed discussion of such impact is beyond the
scope of this paper). Section 7 discusses work related to our concept of FDS, such as re-
search on policy based frameworks. Section 8 discusses some open problems raised by the
FDS architecture. And Section 9 concludes this paper.
A comment about terminology: We will replace the common term “component,”
used above, with the term “actor”—which may be any autonomous process of computation
that sends and receives messages. The term actor is meant to reflect the fact that the
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framework of an FDS is oblivious of the internals of the components of the distributed
system governed by it, focusing only on their externally observable activities, namely on
the exchange of messages between them. We will, nevertheless, use occasionally the term
“component,” particularly when discussing related work.
2 The Principles Underlying the FDS Architecture
We spell out here the underlying principle of the FDS architecture, which are the key prop-
erties that an FDS is to satisfy—along with their rationale.
1. While the framework of an FDS is to regulate the flow of messages in a system, it is
to be oblivious of the code of the components that send and receive such messages. We
have pointed out in the Introduction that obliviousness of the code is necessary for
open systems, because of the lack of global knowledge of, and control over much of this
code. Moreover, this principle has several advantages, even for monolithic systems,
as follows: (a) it makes the framework independent of the languages in which the
various system components are written; (b) it simplifies the enforcement of laws, by
not requiring the laws of the framework to be weaved into the code of components, as
under AOP [13]; and (c) it enhances the dependability of the constraints imposed by
the framework, in that they are invariant of the evolution of the code.
2. The framework should be able to be sensitive to the history of interaction—i.e., it should
be stateful. This is required to enable the imposition of inherently stateful coordination
protocols, such as the rate-control protocol discussed above, or the choreographies
under SOA [2].
3. The enforcement of the laws of a framework should to be decentralized. This is required
for several reasons: first, for scalability, because the enforcement of stateful constraint
via a single, even if replicated, reference monitor is unscalable; second, for preventing
the enforcement mechanism itself from becoming a single point of failure; and third,
for avoiding having a central target for attacks.
4. Law enforcement must be strict. By “strict enforcement” we mean, for example, that
messages prohibited by the framework should not be transfered. We note that strict
enforcement is necessary for dependability—one cannot depend on a law that may or
may not be followed by the system3. We not however, that that laws themselves may
be lenient in various respects. In particular, a law may explicitly allow an undesirable
message to be transferred as is, requiring a copy of this message to be sent to some
monitor or manager, for future disposition.
5. A degree of trust needs to be established between all actors of a given FDS, regarding
their interactive behavior: Such trust is obviously necessary for effective interaction
3The strict enforcement is the main reason for using the term “law” for what is often called “policy,”
particularly in the access control (AC) literature. A policy generally means a constraint, or a plan of action,
that may or may not be enforced. We are using the term law in some analogy to the laws of nature, which
are rules that are known to be satisfied.
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between the various actors of a system, and there is normally a very little basis for
such trust in open systems, such as under SOA.
6. The structure of the framework should be highly modular. Modularity is required be-
cause the body of laws that needs to be imposed over the flow of messages in a large
and heterogeneous distributed system is unlikely to be monolithic. It would gener-
ally be composed of multitude of diverse and semi independent laws, which may be
formulated by different stakeholders, at different times, with little or no coordination
with each other. One such law may impose global constraints over the entire system in
question. Other laws may govern different parts of the system—e.g., different divisions
that may belong to different administrative domains. Still other types of laws may
govern groups of actors dispersed throughout the system, which are involved in some
collaborative activity, imposing a suitable coordination protocol on them. And many
of these laws may have to conform to others—in particular, all of them would need to
conform to the global system law.
Such a collection of distinct laws need to be represented as modules of the framework,
in a manner that would facilitates their incremental construction and evolution, by
different stake-holder. We will satisfy these requirements via what we will call confor-
mance hierarchy of laws.
7. The evolution of the framework of an FDS should be controllable: This is important
because a change of the framework might have a strong effect on the system it governs.
And the simplest way to enable such control is to make the framework self-regulatory.
We shall see in due course how these principles are satisfied by the FDS architecture.
3 The (LGI) Middleware—a Partial Overview
The FDS architecture requires a suitable middleware for supporting the principles stated in
Section 2. We have chosen for this purpose a middleware called law governed interaction
(LGI), which had been developed by the author and his students. LGI is broadly related
to the access control (AC) mechanisms such as RBAC [30] and XACML [10], that regulate
the exchange of messages between the members of a collection of distributed actors. But
LGI differs from AC in several fundamental ways, three of which are the following: (1) AC
has been designed to permit access—via messaging—only to those that have the right for
it, and without much concern about the the dynamic nature of message exchange. LGI, on
the other hand, can be fully sensitive to the history of interactions. (2) LGI replaces the
virtually centralized enforcement of its policies with a decentralized enforcement, which is
scalable even for stateful laws. (3) LGI replaces the concept of policy used by AC, with a very
different, and considerably more general, concept of law—which, in particular, unifies the
concepts of mandatory and discretionary policies, views as distinct under AC. And (4) the
structure of LGI-laws facilitates their organization into a modular conformance hierarchy,
which is critical to FDS, and which has no parallel under AC. Some of these properties will
be discussed briefly below; for a full discussion of these, and other, differences between AC
and LGI, see [1, 25].
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Here we present a partial overview of LGI, focusing on the following three key aspects
of it, which are most relevant to this paper: (1) the local nature of LGI laws; (2) their
decentralized enforcement; and (3) the handling of multitude of interrelated laws. A more
detailed presentation of this middleware, and a tutorial of it, can be found in its manual
[24]—which describes the release of an experimental implementation of the main parts of
LGI. For additional information the reader is referred to a host of published papers, some of
which will be cited in due course.
ßLGI Laws, and their Local Nature Although the purpose of LGI is to govern the exchange
of messages between different distributed actors, the LGI laws do not do so directly. Rather,
a law governs the interactive activities of any actor operating under it, in particular, by
imposing constraints on the messages that such an actor can send and receive.
A law L is defined over three elements—described with respect to a given actor x that
operates under this law: (1) A set E of interactive events that may occur at any actor,
including the arrival of a message at x, and the sending of a message by it. (2) The control-
state (or, simply, state) Sx associated with x—which is distinct from the internal state of x,
of which the law is oblivious. And (3) a set O of interactive operations—such as forwarding
a message and accepting one—that can be mandated by a law, to be carried out at x upon
the occurrence of interactive events at it.
Now, the role of a law is to decide what should be done in response to the occurrence of
any interactive event at an actor operating under it. This decision, with respect to an actor
x, is formally defined by the following mapping:
E × Sx → Sx × (O)
∗. (1)
In other words, for any a given (event, state) pair, the law mandates a new state, as well
as a (possibly empty) sequence of interactive operations to be carried out at x. Note, in
particular, that the ruling of the law upon the occurrence of an event depends on the state
of x at that moment; and that the same law determines how the state can change. LGI
laws are, therefore, stateful—i.e., sensitive to the history of the interactive-events, at a given
actor x. Moreover, although this is not evident from the above abstract definition, an LGI
law can be proactive, in that it can force some messages to emanate from an actor, under
certain circumstances, even if the actors itself did not send such messages—thus these laws
can ensure both safety and liveness properties.
Note that LGI laws are local in the sense that they depends only the occurrence of events
at a single actor, and on the interactive state of this actor alone; and a law can effect directly
only the interactive behavior of the actor operating under it. It is worth pointing out that
although locality constitutes a strict constraint on the structure of LGI laws, it does not
reduce their expressive power, as has been proved in [24]. In particular, despite its structural
locality, an LGI law can have global sway over a set of actors operating under it.
Finally, note that the law is a complete function, so that any mapping of the type
defined above is considered a valid law. This means that a law of this form is inherently self
consistent—although a law can, of course, be wrong in the sense that it may not work as
intended by its designer.
About Languages for Writing Laws: Formula 1 is an abstract definition of the seman-
tics of laws. It does not, in particular, specify a language for writing laws. In fact, the
6
current implementation of LGI supports two different law-languages, one based on Prolog,
and the other on Java; and another simpler law-language is under development. But the
choice of language has no effect on the semantics of LGI, as long as the chosen language is
sufficiently powerful to specify all possible mappings defined by Formula 1.
Space limitation preclude the description of any of these languages, but to give a sense
of them we replicate in Figure 1 a law LCC (for “Congestion Control”) written in the Prolog
based law-language of LGI, which essentially4 represents the RC protocol introduced in
Section 1. This law is explained in detail in [26], where it was first introduced.
Initially: Each client has in its control state: (1) the term clock(T) , where T represents the local
current time; (2) a term delay(DT) where DT represents the minimum delay between successive
messages sent by the client to the server s; and (3) a term lastCall(Tlast) where Tlast is
the time when the last message was sent to the server (initially set to 0).
R1. sent(s, , ) :- do(forward).
R2. arrived(s,changeDelay(Val),X) :-
do(delay(DT) ← delay(Val)),
do(deliver(memo(changeDelay(Val)))).
R3. arrived( , , ) :- do(deliver).
R4. sent(X,M,s) :-
lastCall(Tlast)@CS,delay(DT)@CS,clock(T)@CS,
T > (Tlast + DT),
do(lastCall(Tlast) ← lastCall(T)),do(forward).
Figure 1: Law LCC that establishes congestion control
ßThe Decentralized Law Enforcement,
and the Concept of L-agent The local nature of laws enable their decentralized enforce-
ment, because a law can be enforced on every actor subject to it with no knowledge of, or
dependency on, the simultaneous interactive state of any other actor of the system. Such
enforcement is scalable even for highly stateful policies that are sensitive to the history of
interaction (cf. [25]). Here is how the enforcement of LGI works.
To communicate under a given LGI law L, an actor x needs to engage a generic software
entity called controller 5, which generally does not reside on the host of its patron x. The
controller is built to mediate the interactive activities of any actor that engages it, under
any well formed law that the actor chooses. Once such a controller T is engaged by an actor
x, subject to a law L, it becomes the private mediator for the interactive activities of x, and
4This law differs from our RC protocol in several ways: (a) it enables every actor (not just a single actor
as v under RC) to control the rate of messages sent to it (which is done via a message “changeDelay” instead
of the “slowDownTo” under RC); (b) and its state initialization is done differently under present version of
LGI.
5Controllers are actually hosted by controller-pools, each of which can host a number of private controllers,
which may operate under different laws.
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Figure 2: Interaction between a pair of LGI-agents, mediated by a pair of controllers under
possibly different laws.
is denoted by TLx . The pair 〈x, T
L
x 〉 is called an L-agent—or, more generally an LGI-agent,
and sometimes simply an agent. And a set of interacting L-agent, for a given law L, is called
an L-community.
Figure 2 depict the manner in which a pair of agents, operating under possibly different
laws, exchange a message. (An agent is depicted here by a dashed oval that includes an actor
and its controller.) Note the dual nature of control exhibited here: The transfer of a message
is first mediated by the sender’s controller, subject to the sender’s law, and then by the
controller of the receiver, subject to its law. This dual control, which is a direct consequence
of the local nature of LGI laws, has some important consequences. In particular, it facilitates
flexible interoperation, as discussed in Section 4.
Mutual Recognition: It should be pointed out that a pair of interacting LGI-agents can
recognize each other as such, and can identify each other law by its one-way hash. This
enables them to recognize when they operate under the same law, thus belonging to the
same L-community. And if they operate under different laws, they are able to get the text
of each other’s law.
About the Trustworthiness of Controllers: Consider a set S of agents interacting via
LGI, and let TS be the set of controllers employed by them. TS is, essentially the trusted
computing base (TCB) of S. There are several reasons for trusting the controllers in TS,
despite the fact that unlike most TCBs, TS is to be distributed. Some of these reasons are,
briefly, as follows.
First, TS can be maintained by what is called a controller service (CoS), which is to be
managed by some trustworthy company—which may well be the company, or the virtual
organization that uses the CoS as its TCB. Second, controllers are generic and, like language
compilers, can be well tested, and thus more trustworthy than the disparate actors that
use them. Third, the distributed TS is more fault tolerant than a single, central, reference
monitor, because it does not constitute a single point of failure. And, fourth, TS is more
secure than a central, reference monitor, because it does not constitute a single point of
attack.
About Performance: The overhead incurred by the LGI control turns out to be relatively
small. In circa 2000 it was measured to be around 50 microseconds for fairly common laws,
which is negligible for communication over WAN. This is one of the results of a comprehensive
study of this overhead in [27].
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ßThe Organization of Laws into a Conformance Hierarchy As pointed out in Section 2,
a complex system may need to be governed by a set of semi-independent laws. LGI enables
the organization of such a collection of laws, which collectively governs a single system, into
what is called a conformance hierarchy. This is a tree of laws rooted by law called LR, in
which every law, except of LR itself, conforms transitively to its superior law, in a sense
to be described below. Moreover the conformance relation between laws is inherent in the
hierarchy, requiring no extra validation. For a formal definition of such hierarchy of laws,
and a detailed example of its use, see [1]; here we provide just an informal introduction of
this concept.
The Nature of Conformance of LGI-Laws: Several access control mechanisms [3, 10]
defined conformance between policies basically as follows: policy P ′ conforms to policy P if
and only if P ′ is more restrictive than P , or equal to it. But this would not do for LGI-laws,
for several reasons, the most important of which is the following. The ruling of an LGI-law
is not confined to a decision whether to approve or reject an action by an actor; it can also
require some other actions to be carried out in response to an event, such as changing the
state in a specified manner, or adding something to a message being sent. And it is generally
not meaningful to ask if one such action is more or less restrictive than another. So, instead
of using a uniform definition of conformance, based on restrictiveness, LGI lets each law
define what it means for its subordinates to conform to it. This is done, broadly, as follows.
A law that belongs to a conformance hierarchy has two parts, called the ground part and
the meta part. The ground part of a law L imposes constraints on interactive behavior of the
actors operating directly under this law—it has the structure defined by Formula 1. While
the meta part of L circumscribes the extent to which laws subordinate to L are allowed to
deviate from its ground and meta parts. In particular, this allows a law, anywhere in this
hierarchy, to make any of its provisions irreversible by any of its subordinate law, by not
permitting any deviation from it, by any of its subordinate laws.
One application of such conformance is setting out defaults. For example, the root law LR
may prohibit all interaction between components, while enabling subordinate laws to permit
such interaction, perhaps under certain conditions. Alternatively, law LR may permit all
interaction, while enabling subordinate laws to prohibit selected interactions.
This very flexible concept of conformance is somewhat analogous to the manner in which
the federal law of the US circumscribes the freedom of state laws to deviate from it. Such
conformance turns out to be also useful for the governance of complex distributed systems,
as we shall illustrate in Section 5.
The Formation of a Conformance Hierarchy of Laws: A conformance hierarchy6 F
is formed incrementally via a recursive process described informally below. First one creates
the root law LR of F . Second, given a law L already in F , one defines a law L
′, subordinate to
L, by means of a law-like text called delta, denoted by ∆(L,L′), which specifies the intended
differences between L′ and L. Now, law L′ is derived dynamically from law L and ∆(L,L′),
essentially by dynamic consultation, as described informally below.
6We denote here a law-hierarchy by the symbol F , because we will use F to denote the framework of an
FDS, which is such a hierarchy.
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Consider the special case involving the root law LR, and its subordinate law Ls derived
from LR by the delta ∆(LR,Ls). And let agent x operate under law Ls. Now, when an
event e occurs at an agent x it is first submitted to law LR for evaluation. Law LR may
consult the delta ∆(LR,Ls) of Ls before deciding on its ruling—although it may also render
its own ruling, not involving the delta. If consulted, the delta will do its own evaluation of
this event, and will return its advice about the ruling to law LR. LR would render its final
ruling about how to respond to event e, taking the advice of the delta into account—but not
necessarily accepting it, because this advice might contradict the meta part of LR. In this
way, the dynamically derived law Ls naturally conforms to its superior law LR, requiring no
further verification.
A notable property of the hierarchical organization of laws is that interacting agents
operating under laws in a common hierarchy can identify the position of each other’s laws
within this hierarchy.
4 The Architecture of Framed Distributed Systems
We start by introducing the anatomy of a framed distributed system (FDS), and then con-
tinue by addressing the following aspects of such systems: (1) the construction of an FDS; (2)
the trust modality induced by this architecture; (3) interoperation between actors operating
under different laws; (4) the phenomenon of rogue communication, and its limited effect on
an FDS; and (5) the self regulatory nature of the framework of an FDS.
ßThe Anatomy of an FDS A framed distributed system—or an FDS—is defined as a triple
〈F,A, C〉, where F is the framework, defined as a conformance hierarchy of laws (a concept
described in Section 3), which is sometimes referred to as the law ensemble of the FDS; A is
the set of actors, each of which exchanges messages subject to some law in F (A is sometimes
referred to as the base system of the FDS; and C is the set of generic LGI controllers that
mediate the interactive activities of the actors of A. We elaborate below on these elements
of an FDS, and on the relationship between them.
All the laws constituting the framework F are maintained by a single law-server, denoted
by LS—which is, itself, a member of A (the significance of this fact is explained in Section 4).
Note that the laws in F make no assumptions about the internals of the actors in A, which
are viewed as black boxes by the framework. The structure of F is exemplified by Figure 4
that depicts the framework used by the case study in Section 5. This particular ensemble of
laws is a three level conformance hierarchy, but it can, in general, be of any depth.
It should be pointed out that due to the conformance nature of the hierarchical law
ensemble F , its root law LR has dominion over all the laws in it. This dominion is absolute
for any provision of LR defined as irreversible. Other provisions of LR may be modified by
subordinate laws, subject to constraints imposed by LR on their modification. Consequently,
this law governs, directly or indirectly, the entire framework F .
The function of the set C of controllers—maintained by some controller service (CoS)—
is to mediate the interactive activities of actors in the set A, subject to various laws in F .
Therefore, this CoS constitutes the trusted computing base (TCB) of the FDS—trusted to
enforce the laws of the framework F . For an actor x to operate subject to law L in F , it
has to acquire a controller from the CoS, and engage it to operate under a law L in F , thus
forming an L-agent, namely the pair 〈x, TL
a
〉 of an actor with its controller. We will often
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Figure 3: A Schematic Depiction of an FDS
refer to the agents thus operating subject to laws in F , as F -agents.
Note that a single actor can animate several different F -agents, via different controllers,
operating subject to the same or different laws. This may be the case, for example, when a
single server provides several different services, possibly subject to different laws. Therefore,
it is the F -agents that are the loci of control by the framework, not the actors. Not also that
an actor x that animates one or several F -agents of a given system S, may, at the same time,
operate as part of other systems, which may or may not be framed—this is particularly true
under SOA, whose components may be independent services, which serve several systems.
An FDS is portrayed schematically by Figure 3. The actors in A are depicted within the
dotted rectangle by irregular shaded figures, representing the presumed heterogeneity of such
actors. The controllers belonging to C are depicted by rectangles. Finally, the dark irregular
shapes on top of this figure depicts actors that do not operate under laws in F , or under
LGI at all—and thus do not belong to the system in question, although they may interact
with its F -agents, depending on the laws under which these F -agents operate. Note also
that actor b is depicted as animating two F -agents operating via two different controllers.
ßThe Construction of an FDS We describe here the construction of an FDS from scratch,
which is quite straightforward. A related, but more complex, issue is that of the conversion
of a legacy system into an FDS, which is still under investigation. The construction of a
brand new FDS can be described as consisting of two consecutive phases: (1) the design and
construction of the foundation of S; and (2) the incremental construction of the rest of it.
The foundation of an FDS S consists of two distinct part: (a) the root law LR of the
framework F of S, which can be viewed as part of the design of S, and would determine
its overall structure; and (b) the components, required for the definition of LR. These
components must include the law-server LS that maintains F , and it may include some
other components, such as a certification authority (CA) which law LR may employ for the
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authentications of actors.
Once the foundation of S is in place, the rest of it can be constructed incrementally, via
two kinds of steps: (1) Adding a law to F , subordinate to an existing law in it. And (2)
introducing a new F -agent into system S, by having an actor x adopt some law L of F .
This actor x may already animate some F -agents of S; or it may be a new actor that have
been built specifically for system S, and it can even be an autonomous actor that operates
in several systems, as pointed out above. But, as we shall see in Section 5, a law may
impose conditions on the actors attempting to adopt it, in particular, by requiring actors
to authenticate themselves in a specified manner in order to operate under a given law.
And note again, as have already pointed out, that a given actor can form several different
F -agents, operating under possibly different laws.
These two types of additions to an FDS can be carried out by different stakeholder, and it
can be done in various orders; and many of them can be done concurrently. Such incremental
construction has two additional aspects that are discussed below.
(1) Immunity from Inconsistencies A complex system, regulated by multiple policies,
may, in general, suffer from inconsistencies, particularly if these policies are formulated by
different stakes holder. Such inconsistencies plagues many AC mechanisms, such as a set
of firewalls protecting an enterprise [11], and the XACML [10] mechanism—both of which
require techniques for resolving such inconsistencies.
But the framework of an FDS is inherently free of inconsistencies. Indeed, a single,
monolithic law, defined by Formula 1, is self consistent, as pointed out in Section 3. A
single law in a hierarchy, which is the result of applying a sequence of deltas to the root
law is self consistent by its construction, as described in Section 3. Finally, the set of laws
constituting a framework F is immune from inconsistencies with each other, because different
laws govern the interactive activities of different agents, so they cannot, by definition, be
inconsistent—although they may refuse to interoperate (c.f. Section 4).
This inherent lack of inconsistencies facilitates the construction and evolution of the
framework of an FDS, and makes it easier to reason about it. But of course, being consistent
does not mean that a single law in F , or F as a whole, cannot be wrong. It is wrong if it
does not satisfy the intention of its designers—which can, of course, happen.
(2) Laws do not Need to be Diffused Among Controllers: Given the multiplicity
of controllers, operating under different laws, one may think that there is a need to diffuse
carefully the right laws in the right controllers. This is, essentially, what is done for enterprise
systems protected via a distributed set firewalls operating under different policies [11]. Such
diffusion tends to be complex, costly, and error prone. However, no such diffusion is necessary
in the case of FDS, for the simple reason that the selection of laws to operate under is done
by the actors themselves, as has been discussed above.
ßThe Trust Modality Induced by this Architecture The effective operation of a distributed
system requires a degree of trust between interacting actors. Unfortunately there is generally
very little basis for trust between the actors of an open distributed system. The FDS
architecture provides for a useful mode of such a trust—not between the actors themselves,
but between the F -agents animated by such actors. This mode of trust is defined by the
following properties of the FDS architecture:
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1. One can trust the observable—i.e., interactive—behavior of every F -agent to comply
with the law under which it operates. This is the consequence of the fact that LGI-laws
are strictly enforced.
2. An F -agent x can recognize if its interlocutor y is also an F -agent, and it can recognize
the law under which y operates, as well as the position of this law in the the hierarchical
structure of the framework. Moreover, x is able to get the text of the law of its
interlocutor from the law-server. (These properties have been introduced in Section 3.)
3. All F -agents in a given FDS can be trusted to comply with the irreversible provisions
of the root law LR of F , because they dominate all other laws.
We call the the mode of trust resulting from these properties law-based trust, or L-trust for
short. This mode of trust, which is independent of the code of actors that animate the
F -agents in question, is fundamental to FDS as it facilitates some of its basic features, such
as the easy of interoperation between F -agents. (for a more comprehensive discussion of
L-trust see [1].)
ßInteroperation Between F -Agents Different F -agents operating under different laws in
F often need to interoperate, i.e., to interact with each other without violating their own
laws. Although this is analogous to interoperability under conventional access control (AC),
our interoperation mechanisms is different, and far simpler, and more flexible, than that
under AC.
The conventional AC approach to interoperability [20] between parties operating under
policies P1 and P2, respectively, has been to compose these policies into a single policy P12,
which is, in some sense, consistent with both P1 and P2. The composition P12 is then to
be fed into an appropriate reference monitor, which would mediate the interaction between
the two parties. Unfortunately, composition of policies has several serious drawbacks: (a)
manual composition is laborious, and error prone; and (b) automatic composition is com-
putationally hard [20], and often impossible because the two given policies are inconsistent.
Yet, composition is the natural, and perhaps necessary, approach to interoperability under
AC—because AC employs a single reference monitor to mediate the interaction of any pair
of agents.
On the other hand, under FDS (and more generally, under LGI), composition of laws is
neither natural nor necessary. This is because of dual mediation for every pairwise inter-
action. To see this, first consider two actors x1 and x2, operating under laws L1 and L2,
respectively. Due to the dual control over interactions under LGI, via two separate con-
trollers (as shown in Figure 2), there is no need to compose L1 and L2 into a single law in
order to enable x1 and x2 to interoperate. Rather, since each of this laws can recognize the
other—due to L-trust—they can specify their conditions, if any, for interoperation with it.
Moreover, since the two interacting laws belong to a conformance hierarchy F , it follows
that they both conform to the law L that is their lowest common ancestor in F ; in particular,
all the law in F conform to the root law LR. If this commonality between L1 and L2 is
sufficient for them to interoperate then they can do it seamlessly.
ßRogue Communication, and its Limited Effect on an FDS
While the framework of an FDS has complete control over the interactive activities of its
F -agents—i.e., of the messages sent and received by them—it does not, generally, control all
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the flow of messages in the system at hand. The reason for this is that under most circum-
stances (described in paragraph (2) below) any actor can engage in “direct communication”
(via TCP/IP, say), not subject to any law in F . In the context of an FDS, we call such
communication rogue, because it is not bound by the framework of this system. (Figure 3
depicts such communication by the dotted arrow from actor b of S to the external actor
u—this message is rogue in that it is a direct message, not mediated by any controller, and
thus not subject to F .) It should be pointed out, however, that a framework F may allow
some F -agents to communicate with certain actors not operating under F—particularly with
Internet cites that do not belong to the FDS in question. But such messages are not rogue,
as they are regulated by F .
Obviously, rogue communication can undermine the control that a framework has over an
FDS. Suppose, for example, that F blocks all communication with a certain website w. This
means, of course, that no F -agent can communicate with w. But the code of an actor that
animate some F -agent can do so by direct messaging, and thus can reveal some information
that should not be shared with w. This is, of course, a general problem, not specific to FDS
or to LGI. For example the access control imposed by the reference monitor of the XACML
mechanism [10] over the components of an enterprise, does not really determine who can
access whom, because components can simply bypass this reference monitor.
Yet, as we shall see in the following paragraph, the ability of rogue communication to
undermine the provisions of the framework of an FDS is limited, due, in part, to the existence
of L-trust.
(1) The Limited Effect of Rogue Communication on an FDS: Even if any actor
can use rogue communication, one can expect most functional communication in an FDS to
be done by F -agents. This is because actors may be virtually compelled to operate as an
F -agent, if they need the services of some F -agent, whose law does not allow communication
with non F -agents. And often it is sufficient to know for a fact that a single actor oper-
ates only as an F -agent, for the need to operate under F to cascade through the system,
establishing a global, or semi-global, system property despite the possible presence of rogue
communication. We demonstrate such virtual enforcement with the following example.
Suppose that our example-system Acme provides many disparate internal services, which
are to be used subject to following budgetary control (BC) protocol, described informally
below:
The BC Protocol: (a) A distinguished actor called budget-office has the exclusive
role of providing—via appropriate messages—system components with their ser-
vice budget, usable for any internal service orders; (b) system components never
overspend their service budget; and (c) services can report to the budget-office
their correct income for services, as accumulated in the state of their controllers—
and we assume that services get credit for such reported income.
If this protocol is actually observed, everywhere in the system, it would have the following
consequences: (1) it would provide the budget-office with the ability to impose upper bound
on the total cost of the service orders made by every system actor; and (2) it establishes a
reliable means for services to report their correct income to the budget office, thus getting
the credit they are entitled to. To ensure these consequences we can define this protocol
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as a law LBC , and incorporated it in framework of Acme, in a manner to be discussed in
Section 5.
We now show that if we can assume that the budget-office interacts with servers and their
clients only subject to law LBC , then the above consequences would be virtually ensured,
despite the ability of both servers and clients to use rogue communication. This for the
following sequence of reasons. First, a given service s would have to receive service orders
only under law LBC , otherwise it will not get its income recorded in a form that can be sent
to the budget-office, which accepts income reports only under law LBC . This means that the
clients of s must send their service orders while operating under law LBC , for these orders to
be received by s. This, in turn, implies that clients would not be able to exceed the budget
provided to them by the budget-office. And this, finally, means that the budget-office has
control over the amounts of “money” that any given F -agent can spend on service orders.
So, law LBC has the effect it is designed for, despite the ability of both the servers and
their clients to use rogue communication.
2: Complete Elimination of Rogue Communication: Under certain circumstances
rogue communication can be blocked altogether. This is the case if the system in question
is confined within an Intranet, or within a set of Intranets managed under a single admin-
istrative domain. Under these conditions one can force all actors in A—and the computers
that host them—to communicate only as F-agents, by controlling the network, or networks,
in which these host operate. For example, such control has been exercised for the use of
LGI to control the usage of distributed file systems [34]—via the firewalls attached to indi-
vidual hosts. A more systematic way for doing so should be possible under SoftwareDefined
Networking (SDN) [22].
ßThe Self Regulatory Nature of the Framework of an FDS: Both the base system of
an FDS (i.e., its set of actors), and its framework, are bound to evolve. The evolution of
the base system of an FDS presents no new difficulties. Quite the contrary, such evolution
becomes safer under FDS, because the system properties establishes by the framework are
invariant of changes in the code. This is, indeed, one of the most significant advantages of
the concept of FDS. But changing of the framework of an FDS is far more problematic—
not surprisingly, because the framework controls the behavior of the system. One of the
problems involved with framework changes is discussed below, along with its resolution.
Other problems, mentioned briefly in Section 8, are still open.
One of the issues involved with the changing of a framework is that such a change can
have a very powerful, and possibly harmful, effects on the system as a whole. These include
the disruption of some normal operations of the system; and the lowering of the defenses
against attacks, thus compromising its security and dependability. It is therefore critically
important to avoid careless or malicious framework changes, by regulating its process of
evolution. In other words, it should be possible to control who can carry out which kind
of framework changes, and under which circumstances should such changes be permitted.
Moreover, if changes of a framework are to be made by different stakeholders, it may be
necessary to establish coordination protocols between them.
Such regulation can be readily accomplished because the framework of an FDS is naturally
self regulatory, in the following sense. The framework F of a given FDS is maintained in the
law-server LS, which is, itself an actor of the system in question. Therefore, since changes of
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Figure 4: A Basic Hierarchical Law-Ensemble for the Acme System
F must be carried out by means messages sent to LS, and since these messages are governed
by F , it follows that F can regulate its own evolution. This is a clean, and potentially very
important, property of the FDS architecture.
5 An Implemented Case Study—a Summary
As a concrete view of an FDS, and particularly of its framework, we provide here a simplified
outline of a case study we have implemented. Our intention is to illustrate the nature of a
framework, and some of the impact it can have on the system governed by it. The case study
uses the Acme enterprise system introduced in Section 1, assuming now that this system
consists of two divisions, D1 and D2, serving two semi-independent branches, which are
implemented and maintained under different administrative domains. Acme also contains
a set of actors that serve the enterprise as a whole, which includes, among others: (a) a
certification authority (called AcmeCA) that provides each actor with a digital certificate that
identifies it; and (b) the law-server (LS) that maintains the law ensemble that constitutes
the framework of the system.
The framework F we envision for this system is a three level conformance hierarchy of
laws, depicted in Figure 4. The first level of this hierarchy—introduced in Section 5—consists
of the root law LR. The second level contains the laws of the two divisions of the system,
introduced in Section 5; as well as law LBC that crosscuts through both division, and is
discussed Section 5. The third level, introduced in Section 5, is a collection of laws that
governs the interactive activities of some individual actors.
All these laws are described here informally, and they reflect only part of the laws used
in our case study. Note that all but the root law are represented by their deltas7, which
specify the differences between the law at hand and its superior law. A reader who wishes
to see how such laws are actually written is referred to [1], where a fairly sophisticated
hierarchical ensemble of laws is introduced in details. Here are some comments about our
informal description of F .
In our informal description of these laws we employ the following convention about the
meta part of any given law L in the hierarchy: (a) if L has a rule that addresses a certain
aspect of interactive activity of an actor subject to it—such as the sending of a certain type
of messages—then this rule is irreversible, i.e., it cannot be deviated from by subordinate
7The concepts of delta, and of themeta part of a law (mentioned below) have been introduced in Section 3.
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laws of L, unless such deviation is explicitly permitted by the meta part of L (such meta
permissions are denoted by bracketed texts in bold italics); and (b) if L is silent about certain
aspect of interaction, then subordinate laws have the freedom of legislation about it.
ßThe Root Law As has already been pointed out, the root law LR is the global law of
the system, in the sense that all its provisions are shared by all the laws in F—modulo
modification by subordinate laws, if permitted by LR. The main role of LR is to establish
broad system regularities and defaults. The following is the set of rules that govern Acme,
which should be viewed as a small sample of rules that can be established by such a law.
We elaborate on these rules in the discussion that follows them.
1. Authentication of actors: To adopt an LGI-controller under this law, an actor x
needs to authenticate itself via a certificate signed by AcmeCA, which we assume to
identify the unique name of x, with respect to the Acme system, and the division to
which it belongs. This authenticated identification of actors is stored in the state of
their adopted controllers. [Subordinate laws may add conditions to this rule,
and may require additional operations to be carried out upon adoption,
but they cannot weaken this rule.]
2. Sender identification: Every message sent is to be concatenated with the name and
division of its sender. This identifying information would be visible to the controller
of the recipient of this message, but would be stripped from the message before it is
delivered to the target actor—although the actor can get it upon request.
3. Constraints over the interaction between F -agents: The following two provi-
sions are made by this rule: (a) all inter-division interactions are prohibited, [un-
less permitted by the corresponding subordinate division laws] ; and (b) all
intra-division interactions are permitted, [unless prohibited by the subordinate
division law in question] ;
4. Establishing an Audit trail of inter-division interactions: Every inter-division
message would be logged in a specified logging service, upon its arrival.
5. Providing a manager with the power to control: An actor of the base system
that receives a message stop(pattern) sent by a distinguished mgr actor, would lose
the ability to send or receive messages of the specified pattern, which may be “all”.
6. Rate control: The rate control protocol (RC) introduced in Section 1 is part of
LR—in fact, the protocol actually established by R contains the generalization of RC
alluded to in footnote 2.
Discussion: The following is an elaboration on these rules, which provides some clarifica-
tion and motivation for them.
Rule 1 provides Acme with a degree of control—exercised via its CA—over which actors
can operate as F -agents, and under which laws in F . Note that this provision is irreversible,
governing all F -agents, although it can be tightened by subordinate laws. Also, note that
maintaining the certified identification of each actor in the state of its controller facilitate
the enforcement of other rules of this law, such as rules 2 and 3.
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Rule 2 provides the receiver of a message the ability to identify its sender. This is more
informative and more trustworthy than identifying the sender by its IP address, which may
not carry much meaning to the receiver, and which can be spoofed. Such identification can
be useful in many ways. In particular it is used here for enforcing the constraints of Rule 3.
Rule 3 establishes two different types of access control provisions: Provision (a) prohibits
all inter-division interaction, as a default, allowing subordinate division laws to permit any
such interactions (see Section 5 for how this can be done). (Note the unconventional nature
of this type of conformance, where the subordinate division laws can be more permissive
than their superior law.) Provision (b) is analogous to (a), with the opposite effect.
Rule 4 ensures dependable logging of all inter-division messages. Note that this rule
can be stated here despite the fact that Rule 3 of the same law prohibits all inter-division
messages—but if such an interaction would be permitted by the subordinate division laws,
it would be subject to this rule.
Rule 5 enables system managers operating via the distinguished actormgr to prohibit any
given actor from sending and receiving messages that fit a specified pattern. Such prohibition
with the patter “all” would effectively remove the actor in question from a system by stopping
all its communication. This is just an example of how one can endow system manager with
a real power over the distributed system it is managing.
Finally, Rule 6, which implements the rate-control protocol introduced in Section 1, must
be part of the root law, as it apply to the entire system.
ßDivision Laws A division law, say law LD1 of division D1, is to be derived from the root
law LR via a delta ∆(LR,LD1). One can reasonably assume that the writer of this delta has
some idea of the intended structure of this division, and on the intended role and function
of certain of its actors. This delta can, then, be used to impose this structure. For example,
the delta of law LD1 may make the following three types of provisions.
(1) Constraint on the Composition of D1: Given that Rule 1 of law LR permits its
subordinate laws to add conditions on their adoption , this delta may require that actors
adopting law LD1 would be authenticated as belonging to division D1.
(2) Imposing Constraints over Intra-Division Interaction: Recall that all intra-
division interaction have been permitted by LR, as a default, allowing subordinates laws to
impose arbitrary prohibitions on such interactions. So, this delta can impose any desired
prohibition on the interactions between F -agents belonging to D1.
(3) Enabling Selected Inter-Division Interactions: Recall that inter-division inter-
actions are prohibited by law LR, as a default, allowing subordinates laws to permit them.
Note, however, that for an interaction between D1 and D2 to be enabled, it must be permit-
ted by both LD1 and LD2—this is due to the local nature of our laws. For example, to permit
a message from an F -agent a1 in D1 to an F -agent a2 in D2, law LD1 needs to permit a1 to
send a message to a2, and LD2 needs to permit a2 to receive this message. Of course, such a
permission may be formulated to apply to whole sets of interaction types; for instance, the
laws of the two divisions can have rules resulting in enabling certain types of messages to be
exchanged between a certain pairs of F -agents belonging to the two divisions.
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ßLaws of Individual actors: An actor x belonging to a certain division, say D1, may
operate directly under law LD1. But x may chooses to operate under its own law Lx—
subordinate to LD1. One reason for x to do so can be as follows: Suppose that x is a web
server, and that it makes certain promises to its clients about the services it provides. But
such promises are not very credible if they are just stated, on the website of x say——
particularly not in an open system, where the code of the service is not known to its clients,
and where this code can be changed without the client’s knowledge. This is a serious and
well known difficulty with services over the Internet.
However, promises that can be formulated in terms of message exchange can be rendered
trustworthy and dependable by formulating them as a law, and then providing one’s services
via a controller that enforces this law. The clients of such a service can trust these law-based
promises due to the existence of L-trust, which has the following consequences: (a) the
promise can be verified by studying the law—which is likely to be much smaller and simpler
than the server’s code; and (b) the law cannot be changes without the client’s knowledge.
There are many examples of important promises that can be rendered trustworthy in this
way, including such things as money back guarantees, the so called service level agreements
(SLAs), confidentiality, etc. And, as pointed out before, a single actor may form different
F -agents operating under laws that make different types of such promises. Below is a more
detailed, but still informal, discussion of one type of such promises.
Server’s Promise Made During a Conversation: The interaction between a server s
and its clients may involve a sequence of messages exchanged in a predefined order, called
conversation [7]. During such a conversation, the server may make various promises to the
client. For such promises to be dependable, they need to be enforced. For example, suppose
that our server is a travel agent that provides for the following kind of conversation: A client
c may request to reserve the right to buy a certain ticket at a particular price p, within a
grace period t. If the server agrees, it should sell that ticket to c, if c pays for it within
period t—which means that the server should not sell that ticket to anybody else within this
time period. Of course, a law Ls that formalizes such a promise must conform to its superior
law. (Note that an LGI law that enforces such a promise, in a different context, has been
described in [38].)
The Global Effect of of Local Laws of Individual Actors: It is worth pointing out
that although the law Lx of an actor x effects directly only the interactive activities of x
itself, it has a global effect on the system in that it engenders a degree of justifiable trust in
the behavior of x, by every actors in the system.
Moreover, having all, or most, actors in a distributed system define their promises in this
manner, can have an important effect on the dependability of a system at large, as argued
by Burgess [5].
ßCrosscutting Laws
Consider a group G of actors dispersed throughout the system, so that some of its mem-
bers belong to division D1, while other belong to D2. And suppose that members of this
group need to interact with each other subject to a law LC—”C” for crosscutting—such as
law LBC introduced in Section 4. The question is, how do we incorporate law LC into the
framework F of the system, so that all members of group G can operate subject to it.
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Figure 5: Operating Under Two Laws
Using law LBC as an example, it cannot be defined as subordinate to either law LD1 or
law LD2 because group G crosscuts through them. And we cannot define LBC as part of the
root law LR of F , because LBC is not supposed to govern the entire system. So, we place
this law as subordinate to LR, as is shown in Figure 4, and we provide two different ways
for the members of G to operate under it.
The simplest way for members of group G to operate under any given law LC , which
is subordinate to the root law LR, is based on the ability of any actors to operate, simul-
taneously, under several different laws—provided that these laws agree to be adopted by
the actor in question. But this technique suffers from the following limitation: Consider
an actor x that is designed to operate only under a given law Lx (which may be its own
law, as discussed in Section 5, or one of the division laws.) If actor x would operate under
another law LC , it would not be subject to the constraints imposed by Lx—which may be
undesirable.
We have devised, therefore, another way for enabling every member x of a crosscutting
group G to operate under a common law LC , while also operating subject to its native law
Lx. Note that so far LGI allowed only a bare actor x to operate under a some law Lx thus
forming what we call an Lx-agent, which is a pair 〈x, T
L
x 〉. We now a allow an Lx-agent to
adopt another law, say LC , which would mean that actor x operates under a series of two
controllers, subject to two laws, Lx and LC , correspondingly—as depicted in Figure 5. And
it should be pointed out that the adoption of law LC by an Lx-agent, is subject to approval
by both laws, LC and Lx. For more detailed description of this feature of LGI see [16].
It is worth pointing out, that this facility constitute an inherently distributed treatment
of the crosscutting concerns, the underlying concept of aspect oriented programming AOP
[14].
6 On the Impact of the FDS Architecture on the De-
pendability of Distributed Systems
We identify here three of the modes in which the FDS architecture can impact the depend-
ability of distributed systems. All of them involve system properties, which can be established
via the framework of the system in question. These modes of dependability are the following:
1. Ease of implementation and verification: It is easier to implement a given system
property P , and to verify that it is satisfied by the system, when it is established via
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a framework F , than when it has to be implemented correctly in many parts of the
system.
2. Independence of the code: A property P established by the framework of an FDS is
inherently independent of the code of the system, and thus invariant of changes in
it. So, once P is verified it can be dependent on to be satisfied while the code of the
system evolves.
3. Stability: While a property established by the framework F can be changed by changing
F , changes of a framework can be regulated (cf. Section 4), which can enhance the
stability of the properties defined by it.
These mode of dependability have fairly broad implications, as they can be applied to a wide
range of system properties, involved in various aspects of a system. We limit our discussion
here to the potential impact of FDS on the fault-tolerance (FT) of distributed systems,
focusing on the fault-tolerance at the application level of heterogeneous and open systems,
which, as we shall see, is hard to achieve via the conventional means.
The need to develop fault tolerance techniques specifically for the application level of
systems—sometimes called “software fault-tolerance”—has been pointed out already in 1975
by Randell [35], who argued that the traditional FT techniques, designed mostly for hardware
failures, are not sufficient for handling the various ways in which an application may fails.
This is true, in particular, for coordination failures. Such as a failure of a group of distributed
actors to collaborate effectively towards a common goal, or to compete safely over some
resources, due to the failure of any one of them to abide by the necessary coordination
protocol. (In an analogy, consider what may happen when one car in an intersection does
not stop on a red light.)
Considerable research effort has been devoted to application level FT since Randell’s
paper—see [8] for a survey. This generally involves incorporating some failure-handling
code into the software. Various types of FT measures have been developed in this way, for
dealing with various situations—such as exception-handling, recovery blocks [35], N-version
programming [8], and coordinated atomic actions (CAA) [44]. The deployment of such
techniques suffer from two types of difficulties, even in non-distributed systems: (a) they tend
to complicate the system, and (b) when the FT-measure in question require the incorporation
of corrective code in many system components, their deployment tends to be laborious
and error prone, even if the same code needs to be thus incorporated. These difficulties
can sometimes be alleviated via meta object protocol (MOP) [15], which enables what is
called reflection; or via aspect oriented programming (AOP) [13, 45, 6]. Moreover, special
programming languages, such as Argus [19], and coherent sets of tools, such as Arjuna [40],
were developed for building fault tolerant systems. Some of these techniques can be applied
even for distributed systems, if they are monolithic. That is, if a system is designed and
maintained under a single administrative domain, and if it employs a single language. This
is the case, for example, when one can ensure that all system component are governed by
the same AOP code.
But such code-based FT measures are generally unsuitable for open systems, due to the
lack of overall control over the code of the various components, or even of the language in
which they are written. This leaves open distributed systems vulnerable to their own faults,
and to attack on them.
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However, a substantial range of FT measures can be established by controlling the flow of
messages in the system, independently of the code of the communicating actors. Of course,
this cannot be done for all FT measures that can be established—in monolithic systems—by
inserting suitable code into the components themselves. For example, controlling messages
cannot ensure orderly checkpointing by selected components—an important basis for many
conventional FT-measures. Yet, as we demonstrate below, there is a substantial range of
FT measures that can be established via the framework of an FDS, either completely by
controlling messaging, or with the help of relatively few distinguished actors that can be
trusted to carry out the role assigned to them.
Moreover, although such framework-based FT-measures are necessary for open systems,
some of them can be useful for distributed systems in general, even were traditional code-
based techniques are feasible. This for two main reasons: first, our FT-measures would
be independent of most of the system code, and cannot be violated by changes in it—a
distinct advantage in any system. Second, enacting such measures would not complicate the
code because the framework is completely separate from it—this is, in a sense, similar to FT
measures implemented via the meta-object protocol, or via AOP, which we can independently
of the language in which the components are written.
ßApplication Level Fault-Tolerance Under an FDS We consider below examples of
framework-based measures that span the following aspects of fault tolerance: (a) preventing
failures; (b) isolating a system from misbehaving actors; (c) recovery from failures; and (d)
reconfiguration.
Preventing Failures: Failures can sometimes be prevented by imposing a structure on a
given system that helps in avoiding situations that may lead to certain types of failures; or
by providing means for averting failures by actively stopping behavior which would cause a
failure if allowed to continue. Below are examples of these two types of prevention.
(1) Preventing Coordination failures: Consider a group G of distributed actors that need to
coordinate their activities, subject to a given protocol P . As already pointed out, such coordi-
nation may fail due to any member of G not following protocol P . There are plenty of general
purpose protocol of this kind, such as the token-ring protocol for ensuring mutual exclusion,
and protocols for leader election. And there are many types of potential application-specific
protocols, such as the protocol introduced in [42] for a collection of cameras that monitor
road traffic. Generally, one assumes that all participant in a given coordination activity
abide by the protocol designed for it. But this assumption are mostly unwarranted in open
systems. This is notably the case for choreography [2], namely the interactive coordination
between web-services. Although a language for describing choreographies have been devised
by W3C, it is not executable, and certainly not enforceable.
Under FDS, however, if a protocol P can be formulated in terms of message passing, then
it can be expressed via a law LP of the framework, which is to be employed by all members
of group G for their coordination activity—this is possible because LGI-laws are sensitive
to the history of interaction, and because they are proactive—that is, they can force some
actions to be carried out, via a mechanism of enforced obligation, which can ensure a degree
of liveness. A case in point, implemented under Acme, is the BC protocol described in
Section 4.
(2) Preventing Denial of Service: The rate control protocol RC defined in the Introduction,
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and implemented over the Acme case study, enables a distinguished server v to protect
itself from denial of service, essentially by forcing any other actor in the system to obey the
slowDownTo(r) messages sent to it by v. (This is an application-level version of the flow
control of TCP/IP.)
Isolating a System from Misbehaving Actors: The framework F of an FDS can
specify the type of messages that any given actor x can send. And if an actor x misbehaves
by sending a message it is not entitled to—a message that may cause some damage to its
target—this message can be blocked by the framework, thus protecting the system from
being effected by such a rogue actor. Moreover, the offending message may be logged, thus
enabling the identification of the rogue sender, and perhaps its eventual removal.
Recovery from failures, or Self-Healing: For a recovery mechanism to be effective it
should be able to handle a reasonably wide range R of failures, by a possibly heterogeneous
group G of actors. For example, the range of failure in question may consist of inappropriate
sending of purchase orders (POs) to outside vendors, where purchase orders may be inap-
propriate in many different ways. And the set G of actors that may be implicated in such
failures, may consist of all system actors, most of which may have no right to send POs, but
which can attempt to do so nevertheless.
To carry out such a recovery mechanism, a prospective healer H needs to be able to: (1)
sense all the activities of all members of G, which are relevant to R; and (2) exert a degree
of control over the failing actors in G, in order to heal it, or to protect the system from it.
But since in a distributed system nobody has an intrinsic ability to either sense or control
other actors, the above capabilities require certain regularities in the behavior of actors in
G, despite their possible heterogeneity. In particular, all actors in G need to send to the
would be healer H copies of the messages it sends and receives, which may be relevant for
discovering failures in R. And all these actors should obey certain types of commands sent
to them by H , such as the command to stop sending certain, or all, messages. And such
regularities must, of course, be invariant of the failures in range R of the actors in G.
Establishing such regularities by the individual actors themselves, via individual wrappers
[41], say, is laborious and error prone even for monolithic systems, and it is next to impossible
to do so reliably in open systems. But it is often possible to do so by controlling the flow of
messages, as we have demonstrated in [23]; and can, thus, be done via the framework of an
FDS.
Reconfiguration: Recovery from failures often involves reconfiguration of a system. Most
current approaches to reconfiguration (see [46], for example) employ central manager, which
is assumed to have sufficient knowledge of the system to carry its task. But there is a growing
realization that reconfiguration often require coordination between distributed actors [31, 45,
42, 44], rather than being managed centrally. And we content that such reconfigurations can
often be facilitated, or completely accomplished, by means of the framework of an FDS
A case in point is a set of actors engaged in a token-ring protocol, where the ring needs
to be reconfigured dynamically by removing failing actors from the ring, and by adding
new actors to it—without having to stop the operation of the ring, and without loosing
or duplicating the circulating token. This can be done when all actors involved in such
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reconfiguration comply with a suitable reconfiguration protocol; but in an open systems
one cannot generally rely on such compliance, or indeed—on the compliance with the basic
token-ring protocol itself. Having this problem in mind we have designed [28] a token-ring
protocol which lends itself to a safe reconfiguration and we wrote an LGI-law that establish
this protocol. This law can be easily incorporated into the framework of an FDS.
7 Related Work
Work related to fault tolerance are discussed in Section 6. Here we discuss only work related
to the concept of FDS.
The literature is replete with papers that identify their subject matter by phrases such as
“policy based frameworks,” “policy based systems,” etc. But we focus here only on papers
that share our objective to be applied to open distributed systems. This means, as pointed
out by Principle 1 in Section 2, that the framework can only control the flow of messages
between system components, while being oblivious of their internals.
These excludes many papers that provide systems with some kind of framework. Such as
papers about “software architecture” [9], which is an unenforced specification of a system.
We also exclude papers that make strong assumptions about the code of system components.
Such as paper that use “aspect oriented programming” [14]. And like [37] and [6] which are
Java-based. Still another class of papers that we exclude from consideration here, follow
the IBM approach to autonomic system [43], which expect each system component to be
autonomic. Similar assumption are made by [33], whose framework is meant to provide
dependability management.
Examples of paper that share are main goal—to which we refer below as IBF papers (IBF
for “Interaction Based Framework”)—includes the following, among others: [3, 17, 18, 11, 36]
(but note that some of these papers do not use the term “framework” explicitly.) These
papers control the flow of messages in a system, independently of the code of the interacting
components, mostly via some kind of access control (AC) mechanism, such as XACML [10]
or RBAC [30].
However, by and large, none of these papers supports most of the principles of FDS
introduced in Section 2. We review below some of the IBF mechanisms listed above in the
context of some of these principles.
• Scalable sensitivity to the history of interaction (Principle 2): Only one of IBF mech-
anism [36] is sensitive to the history of interaction, but it is far from being scalable, as
shown in [25].
• Trust in the interactive behavior of F -agents (Principle 5:) Such trust is realized
under FDS by the concept of L-trust introduced in Section 4, and it is critical to the
effectiveness of the FDS architecture. For example, this mode of trust facilitates the
flexible interoperability under FDS.
The closest that the IBF papers come to L-trust is trusting that no system components
would be able to violate the AC policy in question. But as we have already pointed
out, AC policies do not regulate the dynamic interactive behavior of the various sys-
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tem components—at least, they cannot do so scalably. Therefore, IBF papers do not
support anything like our L-trust.
• Decentralized enforcement (Principle 3): most IBF mechanisms enforce their constrains
over messaging in a centralized manner. A rare exception is the use of distributed
firewalls for regulating the flow of messages in an enterprise [11]. But no scheme of
distributed firewall know to us has anything like our conformance hierarchy for its
policies—although this would have been very useful in this context. Moreover, this
technique requires complex diffusion of the local policies that the various firewalls are
to enforce, while under FDS no such diffusion is required, as explained in Section 4.
• Modularity of the framework (Principle 6): Several IBF papers [3, 17] employ concepts
related to our conformance hierarchy—which is the basis for the modularity of our
framework. But they differ from ours in several ways. The most important of which is
that the conformance in all IBF paper known to us is not inherent to the structure of
the hierarchy, but needs to be verified, which generally needs to be done manually.
• The need for the framework of an FDS to be controllable (Principle 7): We know of no
IBF project that attempt to have its framework controllable, much less self-regulatory.
8 Open Problems Raised by the FDS Architecture
The concept of FDS, as presented in this paper, raises some open issues that need to be
addressed for this architecture to attain its full potential. Two of these issues are described
briefly below.
Converting a Legacy System into an FDS: Consider a legacy distributed system
consisting of a set of actors A0, which is to be converted into an FDS, subject to an initial
framework F0. Such conversion is critical for FDS to be widely accepted by the industry.
The main problem with such conversion is that there are bound to be conflicts between the
framework F0 and the actual behavior of the legacy systems A0—conflicts that may disrupt
the operations of the legacy system once F0 is imposed on it. One needs to develop tools
for identifying these conflicts, and for resolving them by changing either F0 or A0, or both.
And since the conversion is bound to be a process rather than a one shot affair, it would be
necessary to develop a methodology for carrying out the conversion process.
Issues Concerning the Evolution of the Framework of an FDS: We have already
provided for the control of the evolution of the framework of an FDS (cf. Section 4). But
carrying out any change of the framework of a system presents some technical difficulties,
including the following: (a) how to discover the possible disruptive effects of a planned
framework change, before enacting it; (b) how to carry out a change in a non-leaf law, given
the dependencies of subordinate laws on it; and (c) how to carry out framework changes while
the system continues to operate—this problem has been solved [39] for a system operating
under a single law, but doing so under a multi-law framework is much more challenging.
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9 Conclusion
We have introduced in this paper a novel architecture of distributed systems—called framed
distributed system, or FDS—that braces a given system via a framework that controls the
flow of messages in it, while being oblivious of the code of the components that send and
receives these messages. The framework of an FDS is a highly modular collection of laws,
which are strictly enforced in a decentralized, and thus highly scalable manner. Since the
framework is enforced, in can be considered as an integral part of the system and not just
an external specification of it.
While being applicable to any distributed system, the FDS architecture should be par-
ticularly useful for for highly heterogeneous and open systems. This paper demonstrate the
impact of FDS on the dependability of distributed systems, focusing on the fault tolerance
at the application level of such systems. Although we expect the FDS architecture to have
a broad impact also on the security of distributed systems, and on their entire life cycle, the
analysis of such impact is beyond the scope of this paper.
It should be pointed out, that this is a work in progress, in two respects. First, although
the implemented case study of FDS, described in Section 5, constitutes a proof of concept
of this architecture, the real usefulness and effectiveness of this architecture needs to be
validated by applying it to one or more real (or realistic) large scale and complex distributed
systems. Such validation is yet to be done.
Second, as stated in Section 8, the FDS architecture introduced in this paper raises some
open issues that need to be addresses, for FDS to attain its full potential.
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